














Health technology assessment (HTA) agencies have spread throughout Europe in the past twenty years. The study examined the governance structures for those agencies comparatively, both through cross-national comparison (it looks in detail at HTA agencies for pharmaceuticals and other health treatments in three major European countries- Britain, France and Germany) and through cross-sectoral comparison, notably with economic regulatory agencies in network industries. It examined nine key institutional aspects of governance: legal definition of an agency’s objectives and duties; formal ministerial powers over agency decisions; the appointment of agency members; agency budgets and staff; procedures for experts; decision-making procedures concerning transparency and participation; mechanisms to seek accountability and scrutiny; appeal and legal challenge mechanisms against agency decisions; European networks of regulatory agencies. It found that although there are important differences between network industries and healthcare, comparison of HTA agencies with those regulating network industries in Britain, France and Italy, a European ‘model’ or common set of institutional features has emerged over the last c20 years for the governance of agencies.
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Health technology assessment (‘HTA’) has seen a rapid development over the past twenty-thirty years. It involves assessing the costs and benefits of different health technologies using medical, scientific, economic and other evidence.​[1]​ HTA has become a crucial part of health policy in many countries, as it relates to choices about which medical treatments are offered or financially supported by the state and which are not. HTA is frequently a highly politicised process, being linked to issues such as the allocation of scarce resources, centralisation of power in health systems, the division of responsibilities between experts and politicians, and more generally questions of equity and legitimacy.

Initially, HTA consisted mainly of workshops and discussions among experts. Thereafter, it became institutionalised, with formal HTA programmes, beginning in the mid-1970s in the US and then gradually spreading in Europe from the late 1970s onwards.​[2]​ More recently, specialised HTA agencies have been established, starting in the mid/late 1980s and accelerating thereafter. One indicator is the number of agencies that are members of the INAHTA (International Network of Agencies for HTA)- it was created in 1993 and by 2010, there were 50 member agencies from 26 countries.​[3]​ 

The creation of HTA agencies is a major change for many European countries, as traditionally (since at least c1945), decisions about the provision of public health were taken by government ministries. However, HTA agencies enjoy at least some measure of organisational separation and independence from government ministries and public health providers and sometimes hold considerable powers. This study analyses these agencies, as their creation raises a number of important questions for an analysis of the governance structure of HTA and health policy generally. It focuses on their governance-  the rules and structures concerning the agencies. Thus it looks at questions such as: what types of HTA agency have been set up? What powers and responsibilities have agencies been given? What rules govern their operation? What controls do elected politicians and governments retain over the agencies? What rights and controls do other actors such as clinicians, patients, public and private suppliers of healthcare services, medicines and equipment, have vis-à-vis the agencies? 

This study examines the governance structures for those agencies comparatively, both through cross-national comparison (it looks in detail at HTA agencies for pharmaceuticals and other health treatments in three major European countries- Britain, France and Germany) and through cross-sectoral comparison, notably with economic regulatory agencies in network industries.

The benefits of cross-national comparison lie in identifying cross-national trends and similarities, and conversely national specificities. This study examines three countries- Britain, France and Germany. Not only are these the largest European countries, but they also have differing state traditions and indeed represent different ‘varieties of capitalism’, namely liberal market economies, statist economies and coordinated market economies.​[4]​

Cross-domain comparison of HTA agencies is very rare- at most, studies cover different types of HTA agency.​[5]​ Comparison between HTA agencies and economic regulatory agencies in network industries might appear surprising. However, it can offer concepts, theories and sets of criteria for studying the governance of HTA agencies and also allow those agencies to be studied as part of wider trends concerning delegation and agencies. Whilst acknowledging the existence of significant differences exist between network industries and the health sector, the study finds significant common elements and questions, which are analysed in part I of the study.

HTA is multi-disciplinary, combining medical science, epidemiology, statistics economics and other social science disciplines. The paper examines institutions, especially the formal institutional framework. It takes a political science approach: HTA has strong political aspects and changes in its governance structures have involved decisions and policies by governments and public officials. Indeed, a political science approach seems especially appropriate for use in studying governance structures comparatively- Oliver et al comment that  to “analyze in depth the similarities and differences in HTA and policy structures/processes across countries…would represent an interesting future political science research programme”.​[6]​ Yet political science appears to have been little used to study HTA.​[7]​ 

The paper begins by setting out the basis of the comparison between HTA agencies in Britain, France and Germany and other agencies, notably those for regulating network industries. Then in Part II, it looks at types of agency and reasons for their creation, beginning with a brief overview of the analytical framework used here and then applying it to agencies in the three countries. Part III looks at governance of agencies. It too is divided into a section that briefly examines theoretical discussions of governance and leads to the choice of key institutional features that are studied empirically in the following section. The conclusion sets out the comparison between HTA agencies and those in network industries and the emerging model of governance of these agencies.  


Part I Comparing HTA agencies and network industry agencies

At first sight, comparing HTA agencies with those in network industries (telecommunications, energy, water, postal services and stock exchanges) might appear puzzling. Indeed, HTA agencies seem to lie within the domain of the ‘welfare state’ in which the state is the main purchaser of health treatments, either directly and/or through state subsidies and reimbursement of spending by patients. Network sectors today are industries with a substantial privatised element.

However, without denying these and other differences between HTA and network industry agencies, a number of similarities do exist. First, both health services and network industries are vital services for most of the population. Indeed, whilst health services are part of the welfare state, network services were until recently supplied by publicly-owned organisations (and this remains the case for certain sectors and in some countries- for example, the main gas supplier in France, GDF-Suez, is majority state-owned). Network services are also often seen as part of ‘public services’; indeed, in some countries there are legal doctrines that apply both to state provided services and network industries (eg the doctrine of service publique in France).

A second similarity is that there are large powerful firms in both pharmaceuticals and network industries. Both sets of domain are at one and the same time essential public services and also large and economically important markets. Both also have certain economic features, such as frequently high fixed costs (eg research and development and building infrastructures) and long-term spending and revenue.

The spread of agencies is a third similarity, As will be analysed in detail below, agencies have been set up to which powers and functions have been delegated. Whilst here are some differences, there are also strong similarities in the form of agencies.

Finally, regardless of institutional similarities and differences, the two groups of agencies face at least parallel issues and functions. Although their functions may appear at first sight to be ‘advisory’ and may take the form of ‘advice’, in fact, HTA agencies are crucial actors in economic decisions about what treatments are funded by public health services. Indeed, HTA has been described as the “fourth hurdle” system in health policy making,​[8]​ while the HTA agency in Britain, NICE, as been described and analysed as a ‘regulatory organization’.​[9]​ HTA agency recommendations are often in fact regulatory decisions, a fact increasingly recognised by the courts which sometimes review them. Thus for instance, HTA agencies perform equivalent tasksto network industry agencies concerning licensing/supply, universal service (defined by the EU as provision of vital services to all citizens at ‘reasonable cost’), tariff setting, issuing guidelines and standards and advising policy makers. Their role in decisions about funding/reimbursement of treatments and what treatments represent ‘value for money’ strongly resemble the decisions of independent regulatory agencies in network industries concerning supply and universal service: although the HTA bodies do not license drugs, they in effect strongly influence whether those drugs can be bought because they affect prescription decisions by doctors and hospitals. Hence they strongly influence which drugs enter national pharmaceutical markets. Equally, recommendations about purchasing or reimbursement of drugs comes close to decisions about universal service, since such funding allows access at a reasonable cost, whereas if a drug is not public funded or reimbursed, the costs are almost certain to be high for patients. 





Part II The spread of agencies

A) Analysing type of agencies and their spread 

The spread of agencies is not confined to HTA but on the contrary, is a general phenomenon, as agencies have spread across many domains and countries over the past three decades, leading to talk of ’agency fever’.​[10]​ However, there are many different types of agency. ‘Agencification’ may simply involve administrative reorganisation within government departments- for instance, setting up executive agencies which have specified budgets and responsibilities, or separating policy making and delivery.​[11]​ However, it may also involve delegating powers to ‘independent regulatory agencies’ (IRAs) that are separated from governments. IRAs are significant for the allocation of policy making functions and responsibilities: they involve the formal delegation of powers to agencies outside government; they usually require a specification of responsibilities, functions and purposes; they also involve formalisation of matters such as the rights of different parties, decision-making procedures and the form of decision.

Each country has own legal terms and doctrines, and institutional forms for IRAs. Thus for instance, in Britain, some IRAs are non-ministerial government departments while others are statutory corporations (eg Ofcom) or even private companies (eg the Financial Services Authority). France has AAIs (Autorités administratives indepéndentes). Germany has agencies but difficulties in accepting the notion of IRAs in its legal and administrative traditions.​[12]​ Therefore comparative studies need common criteria to allow comparison and go beyond national vocabularies. 

The literature on IRAs offers a set of benchmarks and criteria that are used here to analyse the nature of HTA agencies in Britain, France and Germany. The definition of an IRA requires three minimum criteria to be met that allow IRAs to be distinguished from other types of agency.​[13]​ These criteria refer to formal institutions and to independence from elected politicians. First, an IRA must have its own powers and functions for regulation under public law. This means that it is not merely part of a ministry but has its own autonomous and separate role. Second, its head and board members must have tenure- ie fixed terms or permanent appointments, with removal from office being very difficult. This condition ensures that elected politicians cannot simply remove IRA heads at will, and again provides a minimum degree of formal institutional independence. Third, an IRA must also have a degree of organisational separation from government ministries and its own resources, such as a building, staff and budget. This condition allows the IRA to have the potential to use its powers without relying entirely on government ministries or other bodies.

These criteria refer to formal institutions, rather than behavioural ones. Hence formal institutional independence must be distinguished from behavioural or de facto independence, which must be investigated by looking at decision making, and is far from easy to undertake.​[14]​ 

Although the focus of this paper is on comparing agencies and on their governance rather than on their creation it is useful to briefly examine theoretically and empirically the reasons why governments may delegate to agencies. One major explanation is offered by principal-agent analyses which suggest that in fact such agencies can play useful roles for governments (and perhaps also for others).​[15]​ IRAs can play at least four such roles for elected politicians in the context of both network industries and health policies.

One function is to enhance credible commitment. Governments are elected for limited periods and often face strong short-term pressures, especially electoral and political. However, some sectors require long-term investment and other decisions. Thus for example, building infrastructure in network industries often requires high fixed investments. Similarly, developing new drugs often involves extensive research and development costs before their launch. For both, the rewards for large up-front investments only come in the longer term.

Governments benefit from these long-term investments by firms. But their longer-term promises are therefore rarely believed, including by investors. Indeed, they face short-term temptations such as nationalising profitable firms, holding down prices or imposing new tasks and costs on suppliers. Governments may find that investors ‘under-invest’ and/or require high short-term returns to offset political uncertainty. To try to deal with this problem, governments may delegate responsibilities to agencies that have a degree of independence from short-term political pressures, thanks to being unelected and having legally-defined aims and bases. They can take a longer-term approach than governments. Hence one of the functions played by IRAs in network industries can be to encourage investment in long-term infrastructure, while agencies in pharmaceuticals can encourage long-term investment in drug development. Companies are more likely to invest because they believe that regulation by independent agencies will not be altered to their disadvantage due to short-term political pressures.

A second function of IRAs is to increase the efficiency of decision making. Agencies may attract more and better specialists and be more focused on a domain than for instance, government departments staffed by generalist civil servants. Agencies may also be freer to raise appropriate budgets and use those budgets more flexibly (for instance, to offer higher pay to attract certain types of staff or to use short-term staff). They may also be better placed to gain expertise and to bring in experts. Since both network industries and pharmaceuticals are becoming increasingly complex, pressures for greater efficiencies are rising. Moreover, policy makers may face greater information asymmetries, in which public policy makers have less information than the actors they are trying to regulate, which specialized agencies can deal with better than general government departments.

A third and more political function that agencies can fulfill is to allow blame shifting. Elected politicians may wish to transfer difficult and unpopular decisions to agencies, which are at ‘arm’s length’ from them, in the hope of also shifting the blame for those decisions.

Finally, agencies may help in dealing with international organizations, notably the EU. Elected politicians may find that national specialised agencies deal more effectively with these organizations, increasing their influence at the supranational level.  Equally, supranational regulation may create technical and/or binding regulation that member states have to implement, which politicians may find advantageous to do through agencies.

Principal-agent theory thus seeks to explain delegation to agencies as a functional response by policy makers to pressures. This study does not claim that principal-agent theory is the sole analytical approach nor that it is empirically correct, but rather uses it as a source of analysis of the functions that IRAs may perform.


B) The legal and institutional basis of HTA agencies in Britain, France and Germany and their spread in comparison with economic IRAs for network industries

There were very few IRAs in network industries in Britain, France and Germany before the 1980s; the main economic IRAs were general competition authorities. However, from the 1980s onwards, they spread, as shown by Table 1, which also indicates the date of the current IRA and in brackets, the date when an IRA was first created.

Table 1 IRAs in major network industries

Domain 	 Britain	France	Germany	Italy
General competition 	Competition Commission 1998(1948) and Office of Fair Trading 1973 	L’autorité de la Concurrence  2009 (1977)	Bundeskartella mt [Federal Cartel Office] 1957	Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 1990
Tele-communications 	Ofcom –Office of Commnications 2000 (Oftel -Office of Tele-communications- 1984) 	Arcep- Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes 2005 (Auto rite deRégulation desTélé-communications 1996) 	Bundesnetzagentur 2005 (Regulierungsbehörde fürTelekommunikation und Post (RegTP) 1996) 	Autorità per le Garanzie nelleComunicazioni) AGCOM1997 
Energy	Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) 2000 (1989)	Commission de Regulation de L’Energie 2003 (2000)	Bundesnetzagentur 2005	Autorita per l’energia ed elettrica ed il gas 1995
Water	Ofwat (Office of Water Services 1989)	 	 	 
Railways	Office of Rail Regulator and Strategic Rail Authority 1999 (1993)	 	Bundesnetzagentur 2008	 
Postal Services 	Postal Services Commission 1999	Arcep- Autorité de régulation  des communications électronique et des postes 2005	Bundesnetzagentur 2005 (Regulierungsbehörde fürTelekommunikation und Post (RegTP) 1996) 	 
Media	Ofcom 2000 (Independent Television Commission 1990,  1954)	Conseil Superieur de l’Audiovisuel 1989 (1982)	Landesmedienanstalt for each land	AGCOM (see telecommunications




The tables shows that IRAs have been created in the three countries for general competition policy and for specific sectors, such as finance or public utilities (telecommunications, energy, transport).  (Sometimes, IRAs have also been established in other domains such as the protection of privacy or racial and gender equality but they are not analysed here). These IRAs have been established by statute. 

The central legal and practical functions of IRAs are to regulate competition and to ensure some form of ‘universal service’ (defined by the EU as ‘provision of basic services are reasonable cost to all’) (for further details, see part 2 below). However, application of principal-agent analysis also suggests other possible reasons for their creation.​[16]​ Two  key factors were the desire to enhance credible commitment, as governments sought to attract inward investment into long-term industries and also to offer more effective regulation. Both factors were strongly linked to privatisation of suppliers and liberalisation of supply, as the three countries moved from publicly-owned monopoly suppliers to wholly or large privatised companies and competition being permitted.​[17]​ Another function was to deal with the EU, which encouraged the creation of IRAs​[18]​ and whose highly technical regulation increased incentives for elected politicians to set up specialised agencies. Finally, a further function of IRAs was sometimes to shield elected politicians from unpopular decisions such as tariff rebalancing and price increases, especially for residential users.   

HTA agencies were created from the 1990s onwards and hence a little later than most IRAs for network industries. In Britain, the major HTA agency is NICE (the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence),  established in 1999.​[19]​ The HAS (Haute Autorité de la Santé) is the principal HTA agency in France, set up in 2004. In Germany, IQWiG (Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen) was also established in 2004. What led to the creation of these agencies? What kind of bodies are NICE, the HAS and IQWiG when examined according to the minimum criteria to qualify as an IRA- ie powers delegated by public law, tenured heads and a degree of organisational separation from governments?

Health service provision and the demands on the NHS were central political issues in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s. One major reason for the establishment of NICE was to end the so-called ‘postcode lottery’ in England and Wales in which the availability of treatments varied according to policies and funding in different areas.​[20]​  It also responded to growing public and political disquiet and pressures about the speed and constraints on the provision of new treatments, especially drugs, by the National Health Service (NHS). More generally, it is argued that NICE was designed as a ‘technocratic’ response to rationing of healthcare.​[21]​

NICE was established as a Special Health Authority by law, namely under a statutory instrument (no 220- The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution) Order 1999) under the National Health Service Act 1977.​[22]​ It is headed by a Board, comprising a chair and executive and non-executive directors, who hold office for fixed terms.  It has its own staff (435 full-time equivalents by 2009-10) and its own annual budget (£60.5m for 2009-10).​[23]​

NICE’s tasks are to appraise technologies referred to it, notably by the Department of Health and the Welsh National Assembly. Stevens and Milne draw an important distinction between health technology appraisal and the process of assessment: they define the former as “the political process of making a decision about health technologies” and the latter as “the analytical process of gathering and summarizing information about health technologies”.​[24]​ NICE does not undertake assessment, which is often done by universities and research teams in the NHS and medical industry. However, NICE carries out ‘technology appraisals’. Although in the form of “recommendations on the use of new and existing medicines and treatments within the NHS”,​[25]​ in fact NHS organisations are obliged since 2002 to fund those medicines and treatments recommended by NICE. Thus NICE plays a key role in determining what the NHS is obliged to fund, a function not dissimilar to decisions by network agencies about licensing suppliers and ensuring a universal service obligation.

The HAS arose from a lengthy process of agencification. In 1990, an initial national agency was created, ANDEM (Agence Nationale pour le Développement de l’Évaluation Médicale) as a voluntary association but under the supervision (‘tutelle’) of three ministries (health, social affairs and humanitarian action); its roles were to set up conferences to create consensus on health issues and promote medical evaluation  through  for instance, validating the methods and resources of external projects, disseminating results.​[26]​ It was transformed into ANAES (l'Agence nationale d'accréditation et d'évaluation en santé) in 1996. It was an independent non-profit making organisation and its responsibilities continued to be largely advisory, notably providing reports for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Security, especially by bringing together panels of experts.​[27]​ Nevertheless, it was given additional responsibilities, notably developing a programme for accrediting hospitals which would include HTA as a method.​[28]​  In contrast, a stronger agency for drugs, the AFSSAPS (L’Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des produits de santé) created in 1998.​[29]​ The creation of these agencies followed the blood transfusion scandal of the 1980s. Then in 2004, the HAS replaced the ANAES. It took on both the functions of ANAES and additional powers and functions, including assessment, accreditation and provision of information.​[30]​ Two reasons given for its creation were the need to adapt the health system and policies to changing demographic, medical, economic and organizational pressures and to bring different HTA activities together under one organization.​[31]​ But another factor was the inability of policy makers to take difficult decisions in the field of health policy.​[32]​ Indeed, one of the main insurance bodes, the Mutualité française was one of the first to press for an independent body based on scientific expertise and equipped with broad functions.​[33]​  

The HAS was created under the loi du 13 août 2004 relative à l’assurance maladie. It has its own legal personality and  is classified in France as an autorité publique indépendente caractère scientifique, hence being counted as an Autorité Administrative Indépendente (AAI). It is headed by a Collège of eight Commissioners, who are appointed for fixed six-year terms (renewable once). It has its own permanent staff (c410 full-time equivalents) and its own budget. 

The HAS evaluates treatments by periodically assessing the ‘medical utility’ (the ‘service medical rendu’ or ‘attendu’) of drugs or medical acts, namely the clinical value for the patient and for the health of the general population.​[34]​ It also offers recommendations (to the Minister) about whether the treatment should be reimbursed by the medical insurance system. Thus in effect, it also plays a key role as an “arbiter” in whether treatments are funded,​[35]​ since non-reimbursement will mean that neither public funding nor the complementary insurance will cover the costs. In addition, the HAS defines different ‘care protocols’ covering treatments, thereby affecting the practices used by doctors. These recommendations have legal weight: thus for instance, failure to follow them can be used to support a disciplinary case against a doctor,​[36]​ while if the HAS issues an ‘imperative’ recommendation, it has sufficient legal force to be open to challenge before the administrative courts.​[37]​ The HAS has broad discretion to decide whether to assess treatments at any time. 

In Germany, responsibilities for HTA were given to the Federal Standing Committee by the second Health Insurance Restructuring Act of 1997.​[38]​ Then in 2000, the Statutory Health Insurance Reform Act  widened the scope of HTA. Moreover, the German Institute for Medical Documentation (DIMDI- Deutsche Institut für Medizinische Dokumentation und Information) was given the task of providing information on HTA. Nevertheless, it was only in 2004 that the process of setting up more specialized HTA bodies was undertaken. In particular, IQWiG was created by the newly-established Federal Joint Committee (the G-BA- Der Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss) with responsibilities for providing reports for the G-BA. One reason for IQWiG’s creation was to strengthen the use of evidence-based medicine and to aid the G-BA’s appraisals based on “the principles of effectiveness, necessity and  cost-effectiveness”.​[39]​ Indeed, it  forms part of wider attempts to strengthen the weak position of economic evaluation in German healthcare.​[40]​

IQWiG is a private foundation with legal capacity. It is headed by a Foundation Council and executive Board, a scientific advisory council and a Board of Trustees. Key members of IQWiG are appointed for fixed terms (see below). One of IQWiG’s functions is the assessment of the benefits and costs of drugs, as well as researching and evaluating current medical evidence on procedures for selected diseases and analysing the quality and efficiency of services performed within the statutory health insurance system.​[41]​ The benefit and cost assessment of drugs involves “comparison with other drugs and treatment options”, but also “takes into account the additional therapeutic benefit for the patient in relation to the costs”.​[42]​ Following IQWiG assessments, decisions are taken about which treatments are reimbursed and which are not, and also reference prices are established. IQWiG is commissioned to make reports by the Federal Joint Committee and the Federal Ministry of Health and then makes recommendations to them.

Looking at the HTA agencies, a number of similar features with those of IRAs in network industries can be seen. In terms of the functions that agencies can perform for elected politicians put forward by principal-agent analysis, there is evidence that HTAs were created to increase efficiency, deal with an increasingly technical domain, and take some of the pressure (and perhaps blame) for difficult decisions. Moreover, with respect to the three minimum criteria set for an IRA,  NICE and the HAS largely meet these. Indeed, they have some similarities with IRAs in network industries in their respective countries. Thus NICE is headed by a Board of directors, a form that has now been adopted by most IRAs in network industries. The HAS is an Autorité Administrative Indépendente, as are IRAs for network industries. Both have their own resources in terms of staffing and budgets. Moreover, they perform important regulatory functions. Although their decisions may take the form of ‘recommendations’, in practice they are participating in making regulatory policy concerning which drugs and treatments are funded and hence available through publicly-funded healthcare systems (whether through direct supply by the state or through public reimbursement systems). The courts have begun to recognise this by reviewing some HTA agency decisions. 

IQWiG has the most ambiguous legal basis of the three HTA agencies, due both to the fact that the German healthcare system retains strong elements of ‘self-governance’ or at least structures dominated by healthcare providers, insurers and patients, and more generally to the lack of a German legal doctrine of independent regulatory agencies.​[43]​  It was set up by the G- BA, itself not a ministry. But its creation followed legislation in 2003 that called for the creation of a new national institute for German health care. Moreover, despite being a self-governing body, the G-BA “has been institutionalised as a legal entity under public law” with “wide-ranging regulatory powers”.​[44]​ Furthermore, its decisions “are transferred to the federal Ministry of Health for final recommendation”.​[45]​ Finally, most of the G-BA’s decision-making processes are “complemented” by IQWiG.​[46]​ Indeed, the G-BA (but also the ministry of health) commissions the IQWiG, that subsequently returns recommendations to the G-BA. IQWiG’s recommendations have to be at least acknowledged by the G-BA.​[47]​ Moreover, the Federal Ministry of Health has many powers over IQWiG. Hence IQWiG is closely linked to the state and indeed has been set up as part of the wider legal system that governs German public health (notably the German Social Code V) and to have been given its powers from that legal system. 

Thus whilst there are differences between IRAs for network industries and HTA agencies, the latter wholly or largely meet the there minimum criteria to qualify as an IRA. Indeed, very important similarities exist between two sets of agencies in terms of those three criteria, with delegation of powers by law, members enjoying tenure and organizational separation from government ministries. 

Part III  The institutional framework governing the operation of HTAs compared with economic IRAs

A) Governance and ‘good governance’ concerning agencies
Governance is a highly ambiguous term, with many different meanings and interpretations. However, its central meaning refers to “a new process of governing”.​[48]​ Delegation to agencies is usually identified as part of this move towards governance and away from traditional ‘government’, in which political executives held most powers. 
Governance however clearly involves structures. More specifically, agencies operate within wider governance structures and IRAs are not completely independent of elected politicians. Indeed, it should also be noted that independence is a variable- there is no totally independent agency. Instead, the extent and nature of powers delegated to agencies vary. Moreover, elected politicians and other actors continue powers or ‘controls’ over agencies, including ‘independent’ agencies, including powers over appointment and dismissal, resources such as budgets and staffing or powers to issue guidance or orders to agencies, or challenge or overturn agency decisions. Overall formal independence consists of the extent of delegation to an agency minus the controls placed on it.​[49]​ The institutional governance structure thus affects the formal independence of agencies and also which powers and controls are in the hands of elected politicians and other actors such as courts and regulatees.

Since powers are delegated to agencies, important questions of ‘good governance’ also arise. At least four issues can be highlighted. One concerns independence in practice. As noted, there is a major difference between formal or institutional independence and behavioural or de facto independence from elected politicians. The former may be undermined by the ways in which elected politicians use their powers. In particular, they may ‘politicise’ an agency, through their use of controls. Thus for instance, they may use their appointment powers to choose agency members and staff who will follow their requests. Equally, they may try to dismiss agency members who disagree with them or ‘persuade’ them to resign. They may vary agency budgets according to the extent to which the agency does their bidding.  

Lack of independence in practice may reduce or negate the value of a delegating to an agency. It may make an agency inefficient. Equally, it may damage its function of enhancing credible commitment, as agency actions become driven by the short-term interests of elected politicians. Even functions such as blame shifting may be threatened, as the agency is seen as merely following the wishes of elected politicians and hence blame may not be transferred from the latter.​[50]​

A second issue concerns capture of agencies by regulatees- ie the very interests an agency is regulating.​[51]​ This may occur over time, as agency staff become disillusioned, the more active members move to other agencies and public attention moves to other domains. It may also occur through the ‘revolving door’ as staff move between agencies and regulatees, creating incentives and mind sets so that agency staff avoid decisions that are opposed by the regulatees.​[52]​ Regulatees may capture regulators through lobbying and through superior information (‘information asymmetries’). Capture may also occur through regulatees offering valuable resources (eg votes or campaign contributions, or even outright bribery) to regulators, political parties and governments. 

Capture is especially likely when there is one large regulatee or a small number of large regulatees, as these regulatees will enjoy lower costs of coordination and organisation than other regulatees. They will often face high incentives to lobby because the potential benefits to them will be high as will the corresponding costs of unfavourable regulation. Typically they will enjoy much control over information and as large actors, be able to muster considerable resources. In contrast, small regulatees, notably residential users/the general public, face major obstacles to organisation- especially large numbers which makes coordination difficult, low levels of resources, low potential benefits from favourable regulation (and vice versa low costs from unfavourable regulation) and limited information, especially in highly technical matters. Thus often capture is likely to operate against the interests of residential users/the general public. 

A third question concerns the resources of agencies- their level, appropriateness and flexibility. One of the reasons for establishing agencies is to increase efficiency compared with other arrangements, notably regulation by traditional government departments. However if agencies lack sufficient resources they cannot perform their functions effectively. Equally, if agencies do not have appropriate resources (for instance, in terms of specialists and experts), they will be hindered in performing their tasks, especially in complex and/or technical domains. 

The fourth issue is the accountability and legitimacy of agencies. They are unelected bodies but take policy decisions, some of which may be highly controversial. This is particularly the case in network industries and healthcare, which are vital domains for citizens but where agencies are called upon to decide matters such as price changes or the provision and reimbursement of treatments. Although elected politicians delegate powers to agencies, the heads of those agencies frequently have protection against dismissal. Moreover, they do not have to answer questions in parliament and consider re-election. 

There has been considerable discussion of how to confront these four issues and hence achieve ‘good governance’ or ‘better regulation’. One approach is to attempt to apply a set of principles. Several have been proposed. Thus for example, the Better Regulation Task Force in 2000 in Britain has set out five principles for regulation- that it should be: transparent; accountable; proportionate; consistent; targeted only at cases where action is needed.​[53]​ For its part, the European Commission in its 2001 White Paper​[54]​ identified five "principles of good governance" - openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These five reinforce those of subsidiarity and proportionality. In terms of legitimacy, agencies may enjoy ‘output’ legitimacy- ie producing better outcomes, which offsets lack of democratic legitimacy- or process legitimacy, in which transparent decision-making processes and opportunities for participation (eg through consultation, provision of information, offering rationales for decisions and opportunities for scrutinizing and challenging agency decisions) establish an alternative to legitimacy through election.​[55]​ 

In terms of HTA agencies specifically, Dierks and Haeussler have set out principles that encompass both the Commission’s principles and others relating to legitimacy and accountability. ​[56]​ Their principles are: participation, especially by consumers/users/patients; rule of law- ie application of a fair legal framework; transparency and disclosure; responsiveness – ie responding to parties in a reasonable timeframe; consensus orientation- ie seeking maximum agreement; equity and inclusiveness – ie all affected groups being able to participate; effectiveness and efficiency; accountability to stakeholders. Keith Syrett has argued that NICE indeed has sought legitimacy through such processes- eg independence, ‘accountability for reasonableness” (through public accessibility of decisions, rationales based on agreed evidence, reasons and principles, appeals and enforcement).​[57]​ However, he also argues that this attempt cannot succeed due to problems such as the variety of stakeholders with differing perspectives and interest, obstacles to participants being genuinely representative and the privileging of technical expertise over other values. Finally, Davies has offered a more optimistic view of NICE as a ‘dialogue intermediary organization’, that gains its legitimacy by designing an “ongoing process that brings stakeholder interests into the organization at all stages” and acts as an intermediary in “an uncomfortable space between the government of the day and other stakeholder bodies”.​[58]​ In turn, this role means that NICE must develop mechanisms to build up trust, participation, debate and ultimately some degree of consensus.

Such discussions are valuable by setting out principles and benchmarks for analysing governance of and by agencies. They also point to the importance of governance structures. This is the route taken by the present paper, namely to analyse and compare the institutional design of agencies. It focuses on specific institutional features that are linked to the dangers faced by agency governance and/or that have been underlined by the literature on agencies as particularly important in their functioning. Thus it looks at nine key institutional aspects of network and HTA agencies: 
-their formal/legal objectives and functions; 
-direct ministerial powers over agency decisions; 
-the appointment and dismissal of agency members; 
-agency budgetary and staffing; 
-agency experts and expertise; 
-decision-making procedures; 
-accountability and scrutiny by stakeholders; 
-challenge to agency decisions; 
-supranational cooperation and networks.

B) Analysing key features of governance for agencies for network industries and HTA in Britain, France and Germany
1 The legal objectives and duties of agencies
The objectives and duties of IRAs in network industries are usually set by law. They define the formal institutional purposes of an IRA and hence offer it (and other actors in the policy process) criteria to decide and judge agency decisions and behaviour. 
In the case of IRAs for network industries, the legal objectives and duties have usually consisted of both market objectives concerning competition and other ‘social;’ ones, notably concerning the protection of ‘universal service’ (defined by the European Commission as the provision of minimum levels of service at a reasonable price to all). 
Thus for example, the British energy regulator Ofgem has duties to “protect the interests of consumers in relation to gas conveyed through pipes, wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition”​[59]​ But, a form of universal service duty is also imposed: Ofgem and the Minister “shall carry out those functions in the manner which he or it considers is best calculated to further the principal objective, having regard to- 
(a)	the need to secure that, so far as it is economical to meet them, all reasonable demands in Great Britain for gas conveyed through pipes are met; and (b) the need to secure that licence holders are able to finance the activities” specified under the Act. 
The Act then sets out specific groups who may need protection (eg the old and the sick) and other secondary aims (eg promoting efficiency and economy, protecting the public from dangers arising from the conveyance of gas and securing a diverse and viable long-term energy supply, having regard to the environment).​[60]​ Hence it has offered a kind of hierarchy of objectives for the agency. In Germany, the network regulator, the BNetzA, has a remit including promoting competition in telecoms, energy and postal services, ensuring adequate and appropriate provision of services across the country and guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to the network. 

In order to fulfill their objectives, IRAs in network industries have been given specific statutory powers. Almost all have the power to enforce licences or authorizations. Some have the power to issue licences (eg Ofgem), although due to European Community legislation, in many parts of network industries, suppliers have the right to a licence. Only when there is limited capacity (eg in mobile communications) or remaining restrictions apply (eg in some parts of the postal sector) can member states choose whether or not and to which supplier to issue a licence. Others have powers to decide certain tariffs (for instance, of regulated services or sometimes access to the infrastructure). Network IRAs in Britain have the power to agree licence modifications with regulatees or else to refer the matter to the Competition Commission; if the latter gives a favourable report, the IRA can then impose a licence modification.  
In contrast, the objectives for HTA agencies are much less specific. Thus for instance, NICE’s purposes under the 1999 Order setting it up were very general- section 3 stated that “the Institute shall perform such functions in connection with the promotion of clinical excellence in the health service as the Secretary of State may direct” and an explanatory note stated that NICE would “exercise on behalf of the Secretary of State such functions in connection with the promotion of clinical excellence in the health service as he may direct it to perform”. In 2005, the Order was amended to provide a little more detail- s3 became “the Institute shall perform - (a) such functions in connection with the promotion of clinical excellence, and the effective use of available resources in the health service,
(b) such functions in connection with the promotion of excellence in public health provision and promotion and in that connection the effective use of resources available in the health service and other available public funds,
(c) such other functions
as the Secretary of State may direct".​[61]​
No specific powers are mentioned under the Order (although as seen, in practice NICE plays an important role in regulating health products) 
HAS was given more detailed functions than NICE, but no overall objectives by statute. Its statutory functions include:  periodic evaluation of expected value (‘service attendu’) of health products, acts or services; introducing guides and procedures for HTA and accreditation, developing and introducing evaluation procedures, certification of medical establishments and taking part in the development of evaluation  of the quality of the health care system.​[62]​
The legal purpose of the IQWiG comprises advancement in science, in research and in the public health care system.​[63]​ It as the task to support the G-BA in various areas through recommendations.​[64]​ Thus it has relatively little detail in terms of its objectives and function.

2 Ministerial powers over agency decisions. 
Although IRAs are independent of elected politicians, that independence is limited- ie formal independence is a variable and elected politicians continue to enjoy formal controls over IRAs. These controls can include the power to issue guidance to IRAs, to make appointments, to dismiss agency members, to overturn agency decisions and to set agency budgets and resources (analysed below). 
In terms of guidance, for economic IRAs, policy makers in Britain have sometimes separated economic efficiency from those concerning broader social and other objectives that may involve clear redistribution and hence can be argued to lie more appropriately with elected politicians. Thus for instance, under ss10 and 14 of the Utilities Act 2000, the Secretary of State (for Trade and Industry) can issue from time to time, statutory guidance to Ofgem that set out the Government's social and environmental objectives and suggest ways in which the Authority might contribute to these objectives. The government has clearly stated that it expects to deal with such measures itself through legislation.​[65]​ 

Although IRAs take their own decisions, ministers sometimes have powers concerning those decisions. In Britain, network IRAs can agree licence modifications with licensees; but if the minister disagrees, he/she can block the licence modification which can only proceed if the IRA refers the matter to the general competition authority, the Competition Commission. In addition, on a range of specified matters, the Minister can issue ‘directions’ to IRAs. Thus for instance, under the Communications Act 2003 (section 5), the Minister can issue general or specific directions to Ofcom. The Act specifies which matters this power relates to (eg networks and radio spectrum) and the processes to be followed (for instance, the Minister must publish the direction, unless against the interests of national security or relations with a foreign government). Limits are placed- for instance, the direction cannot be used to suspend or restrict certain entitlements to access.​[66]​
In France, certain key areas of regulation remain in the hands of Ministers- for example, tariffs for ‘regulated services’ for final users in energy are usually set directly by the Minister of Finance after the IRA has given its ‘advice’ (avis). In Germany, the Ministry of Economics has powers to issue ‘instructions’ to the network regulator.​[67]​ Decisions of the general competition authority, the Bundeskartellampt, on mergers and takeovers can be overturned by the Minister (MinisterErlaubnis).

Ministers also have powers to issue guidance and directions to HTA agencies. These seem somewhat stronger for HTAs than for most network IRAs with less detail about the circumstances under which they can be used. Thus the position in Britain is that the Minister is given the dominant role, at least in formal institutional terms. Thus according to the 1999 and 2005 Orders NICE shall act  “subject to and in accordance with such directions as the Secretary of State may give” (s3). These provisions can be used for many purposes- for instance, in 2005 they were used in a wide-ranging direction that covered matter such as its functions, the factors it should have regard to, the creation of a new Partners Committee and an appeals arrangement.​[68]​ For France, however, there are no provisions for Ministers to directly control the HAS. However, it is required “in exercising its functions to take into account the multi-annual objectives of public health policy”.​[69]​ In Germany, IQWiG has independence but the Federal Ministry of Health “may directly request [IQWIG] to conduct tasks”.​[70]​ 

In terms of ministerial directions to HTA agencies, the circumstances under which these can be issued are much less specific than for economic IRAs. Thus the 1999 and 2005 Orders governing NICE merely state that it must act in accordance with the directions of the minister, but do not offer any limits to those directions or processes for their implementation. For IQWiG, the position is reversed- since its roles are often presented legally as advisory, the law states that the GB-A must at least “consider these recommendations within the framework of its responsibilities”.​[71]​ France has the opposite legal framework to Britain and Germany as the law establishing the HAS states that it is an “independent scientific public authority”​[72]​ and has no provisions concerning ministerial directions.


3 The appointment and dismissal of agency members

Rules governing the choice of agency members and the circumstances under which they can be dismissed are central to an agency’s independence. They are also important in influencing the basis on which appointments are made and which actors have a role in those appointments.
In all three countries, elected politicians usually appoint or most heads and boards of IRAs for network industries. Thus for instance, in Britain, a Minister (usually the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) appoints the chairman and non-executive members of the boards of bodies such as Ofcom, Ofgem and Ofwat (in addition, there are executive members, such as the Chief Executive). However, Ministers must follow ‘Nolan procedures’, which involve open and public advertising of posts and ensuring they are allocated by open competition and fairly. In France, powers over appointments to IRA Commissions are normally spread, with the President of the Republic usually appointing the head of the IRA, and other members, while the government and legislature appoint others. Thus for instance, the President appoints three of the seven members of the Collège heading ARCEP (the electronic communications and postal IRA), including its President, while two are named by the President of the National Assembly and two by the President of the Senate. In Germany, the President and Vice-Presidents of the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Posts and Railway (the BNetzA)​[73]​ are formally appointed by the Federal President but nominated by the federal government on the proposal of the agency’s Advisory Council which itself consists of 16 members of the two houses of Parliament. Thus both legislature and executive are involved, and thanks to the former, different political parties.
Ministers seem to play a less important direct role in appointment to HTA agencies than for network IRAs. Although the Department of Health makes senior appointments to NICE such as its Chair, the individuals are appointed by the Appointments Commission, an 'arms length body' of the Department of Health, established as the NHS Appointments Commission in 2001 “to provide an independent and transparent appointment process for public appointments, based on the principle of selection on merit.”​[74]​ In Germany, the law states that the appointment of the Institute’s Management is to be conducted in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Health” but also “If a private law foundation is created, the agreement is reached within the Foundation’s Board of Directors, to which the Federal Ministry of Health will appoint a representative.”​[75]​ This seems to have occurred, as four of the five members of the Board of Directors of IQWiG (which deals with day-to-day management) are appointed by the Foundation  Board for a term of 4 years.​[76]​  In France, a more classic IRA schema is used, as 2 members are nominated by the President of the Republic, two by the President of the National Assembly, two by the President of the Senate; however, in addition, a further two are nominated buy the Economic and Social council. The law states that they are to be chosen “on the grounds of their qualification and experience”.​[77]​

Dismissal of the members of the board members of both economic IRAs and HTAs is difficult. Members have fixed terms and dismissal requires extraordinary circumstances, at least in formal institutional terms. Thus for instance, the head of Ofgem was appointed for a five year term in 2003 and 2008. In France, the length of terms is usually laid down in statute. Thus for instance, the members of the CRE (Commission de Régulation de l’Energie) are appointed for non-renewable six-year terms. In Germany, members of the BNETzA are appointed for terms of five years. Dismissal is almost impossible- either the statute makes no provision or else it is for gross misconduct or incapacity or similar difficulties. However, an important difference between countries concerns renewal: this is permitted in Britain (and has occurred relatively frequently) whereas terms in France are generally not renewable (at least not for the same IRA).

The HTA agencies have similar provisions. Thus members of their boards are appointed for fixed terms. In Britain,  although not set out in the 1999 and 2005 Orders establishing NICE, Board chair and non-executive members are appointed for fixed terms (usually five years for the Chairman). Those terms are renewable, although the post must be open to competition. The eight members of the Collège of the HAS are appointed for fixed six year terms, but in rarity for France, these terms are renewable once. Four of the 5 members of the Board of Directors of IQWiG (which deals with day-to-day management) are appointed by the Foundation  Board for a term of 4 years.​[78]​ These four directors can only be dismissed before the end of their term of office “for important cause” or by a vote of two thirds of the Foundation Board.​[79]​ The Chairman and vice-chairman of the IQWiG Foundation board are elected from the Board members for a term of 4 years.

4 Resources: budgets and staffing 
Resources are a key element in the governance of agencies, influencing their independence both from government and from other interests, as well as their regulatory capacities. Who sets the levels of agency resources, the ability of an agency to decide how to use its own resources and the source of its resources are crucial.
IRAs for network industries are usually financed by a mixture of sources. Often they include both allowances by governments and fees paid by users of IRA services and regulatees. Thus for instance, Ofgem’s budget is approved by the government but its cost is the recovered from fees paid by licensees.​[80]​ In France, the budget of IRAs such as ARCEP are fixed by parliament, since they are public authorities, but they then handle levies (which can indeed greatly exceed the authority’s budget and are then handed on to the government or other bodies).​[81]​ In Germany, the BNETzA’s budget forms part of the Federal budget, but is covered by fees and other income from regulatees. Occasionally IRAs can themselves set their fees and hence their budget ( this is the case of the Financial Services Authority in Britain). 
Traditionally, government departments often faced restrictions on recruitment (for instance, relying heavily on permanent civil servants). Network IRAs have been given considerable freedom over recruitment, and hence greater flexibility than traditional government departments. Thus for instance, they can hire on short-term contracts and outside civil service terms and conditions. 
In contrast to economic IRAs, HTA agencies in Britain and France are funded by the government. Thus for instance, most of NICE’s budget come from the department of health, with a small proportion coming from other public bodies.​[82]​ The HAS is financed from a mixture of sources, including state funding, an overall grant, charges for its services and a financial contribution from health bodies.​[83]​ The German system is a little different in that IQWiG is financed 50% by the G-BA and 50% through the contributions from the members of the statutory health insurance funds. The G-BA fixes the level of contributions every year.​[84]​ The Financial Committee consisting of 3 representatives of care providers and 3 of public health insurance, advises the board of directors, head of institute and foundation board in financial matters.​[85]​
HTA agencies generally also have greater flexibility than government departments over staffing. Thus for instance, NICE's senior posts, such as chairs of standing committees, are appointed by the NICE board but are subject to the Nolan principles; so posts are publicly advertised and are to be based on merit.​[86]​ 

5 Experts and Expertise
The ability of IRAs to operate on the basis of scientific expertise rather than ‘political’ reasons is one of the normative reasons for establishing IRAs.​[87]​ Moreover, many questions in the field of both network regulation and HTA are highly technical and complex, requiring specialist expertise. However, in relying on experts, agencies have developed rules over avoiding conflicts of interest that could undermine their position. 
IRAs in network industry have rather few criteria based on expertise for their heads and members. Thus typically legislation deals with who appoints rather than the grounds for their appointment. However, in Britain staff are usually appointed following Nolan procedures. In addition to their staff, network IRAs are able to establish informally convened panels of experts that can advise them. Thus for instance, Ofgem has established the Environmental Advisory Group (EAG) is an independent panel of experts that helps to guide its ‘green’ agenda, while the CRE in France has created numerous ‘groupes de travail’ to help its work. 
Equally, rules about conflicts of interest are often short and general for network IRAs. Thus for instance, Ofgem has a brief paragraph concerning conflicts of interest by Board members, with little definition​[88]​ and requires members to declare them and not participate in discussions and votes in matters in which they arise. For its part, Ofcom has somewhat more detailed rules about conflicts of interest, but these apply more to Board members and staff than experts.​[89]​ In France, rules about incompatible functions exist- for instance, members of the CRE cannot be elected or own shares in energy companies. Instead of such detailed rules, network IRAs rely more on publication and transparency. Thus for instance, they publish background information and also the economic models that their experts use.
HTA agencies have more detailed rules about expertise and conflicts of interest. Thus for instance, the head of IQWiG has to be ‘qualified’ while the college of the HAS is composed of people chosen “because of their qualifications and experience” in HAS’s domain.​[90]​ HTA agencies also bring in outside experts. Thus for instance, NICE “relies heavily on expert committees in its decision-making processes…. The experts are a mixture of academics (across several disciplines including medicine, statistics, and economics), NHS decision-makers, and patient representatives”.​[91]​ HAS  relies heavily on outside experts in its committees, working groups and groups that read documents. It has agreed to include patients and members of association as experts and set out their involvement.​[92]​  Similarly, IQWiG relies heavily on outside experts, who are appointed by the head of institute in agreement with the board of directors  and are organised in an scientific advisory board.​[93]​ Finally, HTA agencies often have explicit procedures about peer review of evidence.
HTA agencies also have rules about disclosure of conflicts of interest. Thus for instance, in IQWiG “everyone who is involved in working on an Institute product must disclose all relationships which could influence the work and the result.​[94]​ There is a list of what this might mean.​[95]​ Similarly, for NICE, NHS boards are required to adopt the Codes of Conduct and Accountability. The Codes require Chairs and Board members to declare, on appointment, any business interests, positions of authority in a charity or voluntary body in health and social care, and any connection with bodies contracting for NHS services. These must be entered into a register that is available to the public.​[96]​

6 Decision-making procedures
Decision-making procedures can be linked to issues of politicisation and capture, as well as legitimacy and transparency. Procedures are usually central to how agencies seek legitimacy, notably because agency members are unelected and also because one of the reasons for their creation is often greater technical efficiency and expertise. There are now often increasingly elaborate rules and procedures for decision making. 
A central aspect is the involvement of interested parties, which can offer a means of responding to dangers of capture and politicisation. As noted above, elected politicians can sometimes act through directions in network industries, but these must be published and their use is laid down by statute. However, in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s, legislation gave relatively few details about decision –making procedures for network IRAs. The latter therefore developed their own processes, such as issuing consultation papers before taking decisions, holding public meetings, publishing background papers giving information about the grounds on which decisions were taken (such as economic models).​[97]​ Over time, statutes have given more detail about processes. Thus for instance, Ofcom is obliged under s3(8) of the 2003 Communications Act to give reasons if it resolves a conflict between its two primary duties of furthering the interests of citizens and furthering the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition. Equally, under s16, it is the “duty of OFCOM to establish and maintain effective arrangements for consultation about the carrying out of their functions” with the consumer panel and there are specified procedures if he disregards the panel’s views.​[98]​ Ofcom must also give reasons for other decisions- eg about enforcement and penalty decisions. Similarly, the Utilities Act 2000 imposed a requirement for Ofgem to give reasons for key decisions and to publish and consult on its forward work programmes.

The German network regulator is also subject to considerable statutory regulation about its decision-making procedures. Thus for example, in the field of telecommunications, the 1996 Telecommunications Act has defined matters such as time limits, processes and participants. Hence certain interested parties participate, notably the person presenting the motion in the chamber, the telecom operator concerned and groups who are affected by the motion, who must apply and then be invited.​[99]​ The overriding principle is that the rule of law applies. (Indeed, the formalized and legalised nature of decision making has led the regulator to also seek informal modes such as informal talks and public policy meetings before formal decision making starts). In similar fashion, IRAs in France are subject to both sector-specific and general administrative law and hence formal requirements. Thus for instance legislation and the Postal and telecommunications codes set down matters such as publication and time limits for ARCEP to act.​[100]​ 
Although much less legislative detail has been provided about the decision-making procedures to be used by HTA agencies, they too have developed their own procedures for their decision-making. Thus for instance, NICE has a three stage process: (1) selection (2) assessment (3) consultation and appeal. The selection stage refers mainly to the bodies and mechanisms determining which topics are prioritised over others. Apart from the Department of Health (DH) other stakeholders such as  health professionals and patients, can get directly involved in suggesting topics to NICE.​[101]​ Different stakeholders have different access. While the DH can submit topics directly to NICE, “for manufacturers, topic requests are submitted to the National Horizon Scanning Centre, who informs the DH of key new and emerging technologies that might need to be evaluated by NICE”.​[102]​ The topic selection process is highly controversial, because of the influence of the Department of Health,​[103]​, which is the central body that commissions NICE to develop clinical guidelines, public guidance and technological appraisals.​[104]​ The primary selection procedures and criteria​[105]​ follow DH guidelines​[106]​. In the next step the “panel’s recommendations are then reviewed by Ministers at the DH, who hold responsibility for the final decision regarding which topics are referred to NICE fort the development of guidance.”​[107]​ Although many parties can be involved in suggesting a topic to the expert panels of NICE, the final decision whether a topic is relevant always lies in the hand of the DH.​[108]​ At the assessment stage different stakeholders (e.g. patient groups, healthcare professionals, clinical specialists) submit evidence (which has to comply with NICE guidelines). Subsequently, this evidence is reviewed through a complex assessment that includes a systematic literature research, a cost effectiveness evaluation (‘Quality Adjusted Life Years Analysis’ called QALY​[109]​ – a cost utility analysis). Finally, in the consultation stage appeal mechanisms (where stakeholders can get involved again) allow for amendments.​[110]​
IQWiG provides reports and advice. Since 2007, its recommendations relate to 1) diagnostic or therapeutic beneficial (2) medical necessity and since 2007, also (3) cost effectiveness.​[111]​  It has panels on which there are five representatives of care providers, five representatives of sponsors (health insurance companies) three independent members​[112]​ and up to five representatives of patients​[113]​. The patient participation Act (Patientenbeteiligungsverordnung – PatBeteiligungsV) from 2003 determines the criteria for patient stakeholders.​[114]​ Apart from the public plenum (that hold a meeting every month); the specialist committees of the IQWiG (which are not public) are the central organs in the decisions and recommendation formulating process. However, these processes are not laid down by law or similar levels of formalisation..
7 Accountability and scrutiny by stakeholders
The ability of stakeholders to call agencies to account and to scrutinise their decisions and behaviour is important to deal with dangers of politicisation and capture. It is usually also regarded as crucial for an agency’s transparency and legitimacy, as these are linked to its claim to procedural legitimacy.​[115]​ Finally, accountability and scrutiny may aid more effective and efficient decision making. 
Agencies face different groups of stakeholders. One is the government, which has delegated powers and retains some controls, but may wish to hold the agency to account without having to limit the agency’s formal independence or act through blunt instruments such as issuing directions. Another is the legislature, which is elected and hence, as with the government, has democratic legitimacy. A further group are suppliers or regulatees that are affected by agency decisions. Equally, users of services are a crucial stakeholder. They themselves can usually be sub-divided, notably between large firms, small and medium-sized ones and then residential users or ordinary users. More generally, even if not directly affected by agency decisions, voters are stakeholders, as  they have delegated powers to elected politicians who have then delegated them to agencies in a ‘chain of delegation’. 
Accountability and scrutiny are aided by decision-making procedures, such as publishing information, consultation or giving reasons. However, more specific mechanisms have also been developed. One is the provision of an annual report, usually presented to the legislature. This is a standard requirement for most IRAs for networks. Another is scrutiny by legislative committees, that can call witnesses and demand information. A further form of scrutiny is that most economic IRAs are subject to control by public sector spending watchdogs, such as the National Audit Office in Britain or the Cour des Comptes in France, which look both at whether public money has been spent legally but also whether it is spent wisely and indeed examine the operation of the IRA.
Scrutiny and accountability vis-à-vis residential users are particularly difficult both because the users are so numerous and hence difficult to organize and because the issues are frequently extremely technical and hence difficult for them to understand. In contrast, large firms can find it easier to mobile resources to understand issues and to lobby agencies, creating problems of capture. To combat this, special bodies to represent small consumers and other groups have been created, notably in Britain. Thus for instance, consumer councils and panels have been created-. The 2002 Communications Act required Ofcom to set up a consumer panel.​[116]​ Its members are appointed by Ofcom, although the Minister’s approval is required for its chair. Ofcom must ensure the panel’s members represent different parts of the UK and also different types of user- eg the interests of: persons living in rural areas; persons living in urban areas; small businesses; the interests of disadvantaged persons, persons with low incomes and persons with disabilities; and the elderly. In addition, the Act obliges Ofcom to set up advisory committees for the different countries of the UK and also for Older and Disabled Persons.​[117]​ Ofcom has to consult these bodies and as noted above, sometimes has to give reasons if it rejects their advice. Then under the Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress (CEAR) Act 2007 a new consumer advocacy body, the National Consumer Council (also called Consumer Focus) was set up; it brought together sectoral consumer representation bodies for energy and postal services. Its functions include addressing consumer issues across different sectors, undertaking research, and providing a voice for consumers in relation to other bodies such as companies, regulators, the government and the EU. It also deals with  redress schemes when suppliers and service providers have not been able to do so, and provides compensation for consumers where it is appropriate. It runs a service called  Consumer Direct to provide  consumers with information, advice and help in making complaints.​[118]​ 
HTAs also have mechanisms for accountability and scrutiny. Thus NICE presents an annual report to Parliament.​[119]​ The HAS also submits an annual report to the government that has to cover its work.​[120]​ Both bodies can be scrutinized by legislative committees. At times, these can lead to highly critical reports. Thus for instance, the House of Commons Select Committee on Health’s 2008 report found several problems with the evaluation process, including topic selection, the exclusion of wider benefits of treatment to society, the information NICE has, its use of experts and slowness.​[121]​ NICE and the HAS are also subject to review for their spending by public sector watchdogs. 
Involving the general public is crucial to accountability of HTA agencies, since their role is to aid in deciding which treatments are available to patients.  HTA agencies have sought to involve patients in their decision-making procedures. Thus for instance, in 2002, NICE established a Citizens Council, an advisory Board comprising 30 members of the public who are appointed for three year terms and meet twice a year for three days at a time.​[122]​ It produces reports that are presented to the NICE Board which “issue a formal response explaining their reaction to the recommendation, and how they will act that on the findings”. In addition, individual members of the public can serve on NICE committees and working groups. Finally, national patient and voluntary organizations can register as stakeholders with NICE, and hence nominate experts. 
The HAS also has patient representation. Interestingly, in France, there are formal procedures, laid down by law and circular, for an association of users/patients to be formally recognised.​[123]​ Thus association needs to seek formal recognition (‘agrément’). Following legal changes in 2004-5,​[124]​ the Health Ministry, after a favourable opinion offered by a national Commission on recognition, formally recognizes an association if at the national level it has at least 5000 members who pay individual subscriptions.​[125]​  Recognised associations can then represent patients in different areas of the public health system, including the HAS.​[126]​ Hence members of associations can be members of committees and working parties created by HAS. Moreover, they can be recognized ‘experts’ which allows for payment of fees. 
Five representatives of patients' organizations and one patient representative commissioned by the Federal government sit on IQWiG’s 30-person Board of Trustees. In addition, IQWiG allows for comments (including by patients and patient organizations) in their decision making process, - for instance in s suggesting topics for it to examine and in its consultations. 
8 Challenges to agency decisions- appeal and legal challenges
IRA decisions are frequently open to challenge. Several different methods have been developed in network industries. One is through mediation or ‘ombudsman’ procedures, which are often designed for low-cost and more informal resolution of disputes and disagreements, an important feature especially for ordinary users and patients. In Britain, ombudsman procedures have been created instead of users complaining directly to IRAs, which therefore focus on regulation. Thus, the Energy Ombudsman was established in 2008. It is independent and deals with complaints against energy suppliers by residential users or small businesses (but only after the supplier’s complaints procedures have been tried). It can take practical action to resolve a dispute and, in some cases, make a financial award. Similarly, there is a Telecommunications Ombudsman that desls with disputes between consumers and their telecommunications suppliers. Thus this method means that there is an alternative to IRA regulatory decisions. 
IRA decisions can be directly challenged through appeal procedures. Sometimes these are formalized through legislation. Thus for instance, some of Ofcom’s economic decisions (those in which it acts through directions, approval or consents), notably concerning competition, can be challenged by appealing to the Competition Appeals Tribunal; equally, some of the Minister's decisions can be appealed in this way.​[127]​ Similarly some Ofgem decisions can be appealed to the Competition Appeals Tribunal, which has quasi-judicial rules as well as strong procedures such as tight time limits. Alternatively, in Germany, the BNetzA operates through court-like chambers that hear evidence and must operate in a quasi-judicial manner, thereby giving different parties rights to be heard, present evidence and challenge evidence put forward by others. It also means that legal processes that are designed to ensure fairness are used. 
Finally, IRA decisions can be challenged in court. In all three countries, most decisions of network IRAs are open to review by courts since they are public authorities. Thus in Britain, IRA decisions are open to judicial review, while in France and Germany they can be challenged before administrative courts. The frequency and ease of such challenges vary across countries, being relatively rare in Britain but fairly frequent in Germany.​[128]​
There are also methods of challenging the decisions or recommendations of HTA agencies. Users can complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, who can look at complaints referred by an MP, including about the Health Service. Hence cases about refusal of treatments can be referred to the Ombudsman. As for network industries, this is an method of challenging outcomes rather than directly challenging agency decisions.
NICE itself has an ‘appeals’ procedure against its Final Appraisal Determinations (FADs).​[129]​ This is open to ‘consultees’ to the technology appraisal process (defined as “organizations that accept an invitation to participate in the appraisal” such as manufacturers, professional organizations, rthe department of health and relevant NHS and other organizations).​[130]​ However, when looked at closely, this is not a traditional appeal procedure, in that the grounds of challenge are:
1 The Institute has failed to act fairly and in accordance with its published procedures as set out in
the Institute’s Guide to the Technology Appraisal Process.
2 The Institute has prepared a FAD that is perverse in the light of the evidence submitted.
3 The Institute has exceeded its powers.​[131]​
These are very close to traditional ‘administrative or judicial review’ in England and Wales.​[132]​  Indeed, NICE states that “will not normally entertain an appeal against the merits of the determination reached by the Appraisal Committee or of the FAD”, the grounds of appeal do not allow the Appeal Panel to reconsider the merits of the decision reached by the Appraisal Committee and new data or evidence not presented to the Appraisal committee will almost certainly not be permitted. ​[133]​ Moreover, the Appeal panel is appointed by NICE and mostly consist of NICE members (eg its Vice-Chair chairs the panel and non-executive directors). 

NICE decisions can also be challenged in court under administrative review. Cases have in fact been heard in  which NICE has been forced to alter its recommendations and sometimes also to make available its economic models.​[134]​
France has a Médiateur de la République, to which users can complain, including about health treatment. Indeed, the Médiateur has a specific section (pôle) on ‘health, security, treatments’ which specifically mentions access to treatments.​[135]​ But HAS appears to have no appeals mechanism. Moreover, it is often difficult to challenge HAS decisions before the administrative courts. Unless HAS’s recommendations are in the form of ‘orders’ (‘impératifs’) they are treated as advice and hence not open to administrative review.​[136]​
IQWiG does not appear to have an appeals process. Moreover, it seeks to exclude recourse to legal challenge, notably through its statute which claims that its ‘recommendations’ are excluded from ‘any lawsuit’.

9 International/supranational cooperation and networks
Traditionally, governance structures for national agencies were highly domestic. However, supranational governance is growing in Europe, especially by the EU. Only rarely does it require the creation of an IRA, but it can take the form of rules concerning the operation of agencies insofar as they are implementing EU regulation. It can  also take less legally-binding forms, notably through networks of agencies, that can influence agency behaviour through cross-national learning, benchmarks and ‘good practice’.
EU legislation for network industries has greatly expanded since the 1990s. Although it now covers central matters such as ending national monopolies and the regulation of competition, with one notable exception it does not require member states to establish IRAs; its main requirement concerning agencies is that that regulators are institutionally independent from suppliers, so that for instance, a government department is not both a supplier and a regulator.​[137]​ The important exception comes in energy, where legislation in 2009 laid down specific requirements for IRAs.​[138]​ It insists that member states guarantee that the regulatory authority be “legally distinct and functionally independent from any other public or private entity”, that the body “act independently from any market interest” and also not take direct instructions from government.​[139]​  It then laid down a series of institutional features, such as “separate annual budget allocations, with autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget, and adequate human and financial resources to carry out its duties” and that its members be appointed for terms of 5-7 years renewable once. This marks a very significant extension of EU powers, aimed at increasing IRA independence.

However, for most network industries, instead of laying down detailed rules for IRAs, the EU has instead sought to develop networks of agencies.​[140]​ Initially, these were very loose meetings or fora such as the Florence and Madrid processes (for electricity and gas respectively), comprising annual meetings of interested parties and experts. Thereafter, loose European networks of national IRAs were set up, with a small secretariat and the European Commission as an observer, such as the ERG (the European Regulators Group, for Telecommunications) and the ERGEG (the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas). These were given a limited legal basis by EU legislation but few powers.​[141]​ More recently, those networks have been strengthened, with greater legal powers and coordinating roles under EU legislation (for instance, the creation of BEREC- the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications). In particular, they now give ‘opinions’ and/or lust be consulted on a series of proposed measures and decisions, both concerning decisions by national IRAs,​[142]​ cross-border disputes and on EC decisions, guidelines and recommendations.​[143]​ Thus European networks are increasingly forming a link between the national and EU levels of decision making. However, whilst there have been repeated and lengthy discussions of creating ‘European agencies’ for industries such as telecommunications, some dating back to the 1990s, no such agencies have been established. The main reason has been opposition by member states. So the EU has continued its approach of incremental development of European networks of national IRAs.





Although there are important differences between network industries and healthcare, comparison of HTA agencies with those regulating network industries in Britain, France and Italy, the two sets of agencies in the three countries share many common points. They are unelected bodies that enjoy important powers and functions in policy making. Their members have a degree of tenure and cannot be dismissed at will by elected politicians. They have a degree of organizational separation from government ministries. Thus they meet or come close to the requirements for being independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). 
IRAs in network industries are a little older than those for HTA. Nevertheless, a European ‘model’ or common set of institutional features has emerged over the last c20 years for the governance of agencies. The study has analysed the key features, linked both to the functions that IRAs can perform (notably for elected politicians), such as enhancing credible commitment, increasing the efficiency of decision making, taking part of the blame for difficult decisions and helping with international organizations, and also to the problems and criticisms that such agencies can face, such as politicization, capture, inefficiency and insufficient legitimacy. 
Features concerning nine key institutional aspects of governance have been examined. Of course, the exact emergence and form of these features differs from one country to another, from one agency to another and from one sector to another. Nevertheless, these features seem important for discussions of an emerging ‘good governance’ model. This is not to say that such as model cannot be challenged or debated- rather it is that this group of institutional features is becoming common across different kinds of agencies.
To summarise, these features are
-legal definition of an agency’s objectives and duties, these objectives often involving both economic ones and some form of universal service ones
-limited formal ministerial powers over agency decisions, these being in the form of guidance, directions or occasionally the power to overturn agency decisions, but with the circumstances for their application being defined by law
-the appointment of agency members involves several different bodies or actors, with procedures to ensure choice on merit and expertise, for fixed terms (usually 4-5 years), with dismissal being difficult
-agencies have their own budgets and staff, with several sources of funding and considerable flexibility about their use
-procedures have been introduced for choosing experts to advise agencies, to ensure merit and avoidance of conflicts of interest
-the development of decision-making procedures to ensure transparency and participation
-the establishment of mechanisms to seek accountability and scrutiny by different stakeholders, including by ordinary users/citizens
-the establishment of mechanisms of appeal against agency decisions and the ability to challenge decisions before courts
-the development of European networks of regulatory agencies.

The study has found interesting and important variations in these features, but their appearance across such different domains and countries suggests that there are powerful reasons for their spread. Explanations for this, as well as the differences found, call for investigation. Finally, the article has focused on formal governance structures. As the difference between legal/institutional and behavioural independence makes clear, analysis of structures only deals with part of policy making. But, those structures do provide a formal framework for the role and behaviour of agencies and hence merits close attention.
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